China has become the largest source of capital in Cambodia. Managers of state enterprises that construct hydropower plants and roads-as well as private investors and managers in mining, agricultural land concessions, and garment manufacturing-wield increasing influence and are beginning to shape labor practices.
But as the Cambodian economy expanded and the dominance of mainland Chinese as suppliers in all of its sectors-from construction materials to fertilizer-grew, reliable partnerships with them became increasingly important for Chinese-Cambodian businesses.
For Sino-Khmer businesspeople at various levels, contracts with mainland Chinese entrepreneurs or matching Chinese investors with Cambodian business opportunities-and the personal and political connections these required-became increasingly attractive as the country was flooded with Chinese capital.
Mr. Wu's 4 career exemplifies the increasing reliance of what can be described as a struggling Chinese-Cambodian middle class on these economic flows. Born near Chaozhou in China, he was brought to Cambodia by his father in 1945, when he was seven months old.
His wife is a Cambodian-born ethnic Chinese who used to teach Chinese at Phnom Penh's Duan Hoa School. Under the Khmer Rouge, most of Mr. Wu's family was killed, and the rest dispersed; a younger sister now lives in Toronto. He has three children; one of them, a daughter, runs a modest hotel in Phnom Penh.
For the past twenty years, Mr. Wu has been doing subcontracting for construction projects. He prefers to work with companies from China, since they pay better, although they are strict about quality. He "doesn't want to touch" Cambodian government projects, because it is hard to get paid and the officials often change their mind about the amount. He has also done a project for a Korean company but found that the Koreans were strict but paid little. He
tries to get what he calls "small jobs," worth a few hundred thousand dollars-such as digging canals, lining reservoir walls, laying concrete, and building small bridges-for large, multimillion-dollar constructions such as dams, roads, and irrigation systems, financed by aid or loans from China and carried out by Chinese state enterprises as general contractors. Mr.
Wu does not always deal with these companies, however, since many projects are already subcontracted to other, often private companies from China, which in turn subcontract those processes that do not require special skills to local businessmen such as Mr. Wu. He then recruits and supervises between fifty and two hundred local workers to execute the work under the inspection of technicians from China. Typically, each construction project employs several such teams; at a given point in one particular irrigation project, there were two other labor subcontractors in addition to Mr. Wu, both from China, but they too had to rely on Chinese-Cambodian recruiters to get laborers. Personal relationships are decisive in winning such subcontracts, so Mr. Wu spends much of his time trying to find informal ways to get to know managers in positions of authority at construction projects. Simultaneously, he offers his services as a scout to businessmen from China who are interested in agriculture, identifying opportunities that suit their interests, arranging visits, taking care of contracts and approvals, and sometimes recruiting agricultural labor. One of his new ventures is a partnership with a manager from an ethanol factory in Jiangsu Province to plant a hundred hectares of cassava in Bantheay Meanchey. Wu provides the workers, Jiangsu the capital, and experts and seedlings come from Thailand. Mr. Wu first met this manager while on a trip to Jiangsu to buy road machinery: he has traveled there eight times in the past few years.
Investments from China also generate employment for Chinese Cambodians who can speak at least some Chinese. Most graduates of the Duan Hoa School in Phnom PenhSoutheast Asia's largest Chinese school, with over ten thousand students-find jobs with Chinese-owned garment and shoe factories as interpreters or clerks. Chinese-invested construction companies and their contractors also hire interpreters and prefer to have Chinese-speaking drivers. So the school runs three postsecondary courses, in accounting, computers, and translation. The role of these Chinese-speaking employees is much more than technical: managers from China believe that, due to their Chinese culture, they understand the expectations of management regarding labor discipline and behavior. They are therefore expected to function as cultural brokers of sorts, ensuring that Khmer workers comply with management instructions and do not make trouble. Chinese teacher, used to work as an interpreter at a Thai-owned garment factory before moving on to another factory owned by investors from Hong Kong, where she worked for ten years. Like most other investors in this sector, the owners had previously run a garment factory in China but moved some of their production to Cambodia due to lower wages and more favorable customs regimes when the garments are exported to Europe and North America. The line workers in these factories are Khmer women, but middle management, technicians, and upper clerical workers are brought from mainland China. Mrs. Vorng was one of three local supervisors who had been hired because they could communicate with the local workers. Eventually, however, she found the pressure to mediate between management and the workers, who frequently struck for higher wages and delivered faulty products, to be too much. Now she works as a maid.
At the other end of the spectrum are wealthy Chinese-Cambodian businessmen who cultivate clientelistic relations with the party-state elite and have privileged access to natural resources (Hibou 2004; Bayart 2005; Mengin 2007, 25-29) . Some made their initial fortunes in the informal foreign trade in the late 1980s; others fled the Khmer Rouge and returned to Cambodia after the UN intervention. Many of them hold the noble title oknha (sometimes translated into English as "lord"), granted by the king. This title requires the payment of at least two hundred thousand dollars to the state (Xing 2008, 373) , but its holders have official tax privileges and informal authority. At the top of this group are tycoons who combine formal political power-for example, as senators for the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP)-with great wealth and informal but widely rumored connections to Hun Sen and other top leaders and the military. Such oknha are in great demand by investors from China, particularly those who wish to acquire land concessions, since such concessions, by law, require a majority stake of a Cambodian company. As a manager of the Cambodian office of a mainland Chinese state enterprise put it: "The first thing Chinese companies do when they get here is find a backer (kaoshan ), like an oknha, who will help them get through various difficulties, liaise with government officials, and so on. Whether or not you will later have to share profits-that varies. But first you have to pay." A particularly well-known example is Senator Oknha Lau Meng Khin, who holds stakes in high-profile mainland These oknha also play a role in the distribution of concessional loans from China. This is significant because more than half of current infrastructure projects in Cambodia are backed by concessional loans from one of China's two policy banks, making China one of the largest sources of development assistance in Cambodia. The loans are made directly to Chinese enterprises, and the initiative to finance a particular project generally comes from one of these, in consultation with Cambodian ministries (Sato et al. 2011) . The oknha play a crucial role as brokers between the two sides, but in practice they are also frequently responsible for identifying the projects in the first place.
Oknha Keth, now around seventy, was born in Cambodia, the son of a Cantonese businessman of some standing who was also chairman of the board of overseers of one of the Chinese schools. His parents took him back to China for the first time in 1964 to visit relatives. He remembers being "scared to death," finding no food in the evening and no flush toilets. ("I held it back for a week.") In 1971, Keth moved to Hong Kong to join a relative and eventually became a partner in a toy factory. After a few visits to Cambodia, he finally moved back in 1998 with his Hong Kong-born wife. Since then, he has been involved in a dizzying array of business projects, starting with real estate, and accumulated a diverse collection of titles: adviser to a senior general (which gives him the right to use a Cambodian diplomatic passport) and chairman or director of several national sports and cultural organizations. no surveying capabilities, it further contracted out these jobs to a company from China. Also, the company was involved in developing an enormous seaside resort project, with a total acreage of fifteen square kilometers and a pledged investment of 3.8 billion dollars, reportedly by China International Travel Service via a front company. Finally, it had a contract for supplying X-ray arms smuggling detection equipment to the Sihanoukville port, this most likely financed through Western aid and in turn subcontracted out to a company in Beijing. All of these projects had Chinese state enterprise partners and were financed with Chinese or Western loans or grants. Oknha Keth's company also held a 60,000-hectare timber concession, which was being worked by a private company from Shanghai, and was involved in two massive real estate developments: a 2,700-hectare development, to consist largely of government offices, outside Phnom Penh, and a luxury residential development in Tak Khmao, the area across the Mekong from Phnom Penh where one of Hun Sen's residences is located. In these projects, companies from China were to supply the water and electrical systems but were not involved in financing. Finally, Oknha Keth was co-owner of a garment factory with ten thousand workers and had a number of large interior decoration contracts for large multinational and Cambodian companies.
In most of these projects, then, Oknha Keth's company invested little or nothing; instead, it simply inserted itself as a broker between two steps in the process, often both carried out by actors from China. Its ability to do so was probably due to Oknha Keth's perceived or real connections to powerful patrons in Cambodia ("We talk to Hun Sen directly and we might even be able to get the price down to three hundred dollars" per hectare, he says about a particular real estate project), but perhaps also aided by the fact that it created the semblance of local contracting. (In the case of the land concession, this was, in fact, required by Cambodian law.) Indeed, Oknha Keth's directorship of a high-profile national sports organization ensures him regular television publicity and control over a particular government monopoly. Yet the same position also comes with the obligation to find investors to finance prestigious government sports projects that need to be ready for the Southeast Asian Games in 2017. If he succeeds in finding foreign investors, the contracts may bring him large profits; if, on the other hand, he fails, he may have to spend his own capital and risk falling out of official favor: the revenue farmer's dilemma, a quandary emblematic of a broker straddling the worlds of state power and private capital. 
Migration from China and the Political Orientation of Chinese Organizations in Cambodia
The November 1990 decree allowing ethnic minority associations was ushered in by Chea Sim's invitation to eleven Chinese-Cambodian businessmen, whom he encouraged to form an association that came to be known as the Association of Chinese in Cambodia (ACC,
Jianhua lishizonghui
; Tan 2006, 188) . This organization was to function as an umbrella of the five dialect-based associations (huiguan ) that had existed in the French colonial era and were being revived. Local Chinese associations that formed across the country in the first years of the 1990s were gradually absorbed into the ACC as local chapters. Cambodians, these remarks may seem inappropriate. The fact that Li was allowed to make them and that they were subsequently publicized in Cambodia's reborn Chinese-language press signaled, however, that both the Cambodian and the Chinese governments now wished to interpellate Cambodia's ethnic Chinese and expected them to assist in the development of friendly relations. In the words of an ACC publication, "while contributing to the rebuilding of Cambodia, [the association] became a bridge to foreign trade, enjoying the everstrengthening trust of successive governments, and became a huge people's organization with a unified structure of leadership, the kind of which is rarely seen around the globe" (Yang In sum, the public politics of Chinese ethnicity in Cambodia is increasingly constructed not as a matter of celebrating ancestral origins or demanding rights in an officially multicultural society, as it is elsewhere in Southeast Asia, but rather within a transnational field that embraces the party-state-nation rhetoric of both the CPP and the PRC-which are, after all, similar. In this narrative, Cambodia's ethnic Chinese are celebrated as conduits of economic and political ties between two friendly nations, to both of which they owe a certain allegiance. Indeed, much of Jian Hua Daily's fifth-anniversary booklet is devoted to information for new migrants and investors from China, from the texts of the immigration and investment laws to tips on installing electricity. This suggests that, by 2006, the ACC and its media already saw themselves as brokers of information and investment between Cambodia and new capital from China. To this extent, it is perhaps more accurate to speak not of a "resinicization" (Duara 1997, 40) For the parents of today's young Chinese Cambodians, the language of the home was Teochiu and the outside language was Khmer. For the younger generation, the language of the home is Khmer and the aspirational outside languages are Chinese and English. Englishlanguage education, however, is accessible only to high-income families in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap; for others, the Chinese school becomes the preferred source of English education as well. In Kampot, for example, the Guangyu Public Chinese School (Gongli Guangyu huawen xuexiao ) offers free kindergarten, Chinese-Khmer bilingual education, and English from the fourth grade. Kurlantzick (2007, 69-70) writes that it is because Chinese schools in Cambodia receive funding from China that they can, in effect, charge less than state schools where teachers often expect private payments. According to him, "a kind of feeder system has been created" where students "who do well in Chinabacked primary schools often can obtain assistance from China to continue studies in the People's Republic, in either middle school, high school, or university." In fact, both funding (in the form of teaching materials and visiting teachers' salaries) and scholarships from China are very limited, but it is perhaps more important that they are a highly desirable, if exceptional, prospect to aspire to. surrounding such events, students are exposed to a discourse of Chineseness that posits the PRC as their ancestral homeland, in whose friendship with Cambodia they, the students, are to play a privileged role: a proposition that translates into the economic reality of jobs linked to investments from China upon graduation. In 1995, the ACC secured an agreement with the
China Overseas Exchange Association (Zhongguo haiwai jiaoliu xiehui
).
This organization, affiliated with the Chinese government's Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (the Qiaoban ), helped develop the schools' curricula and supplies them with some textbooks, both for Chinese-language study and for other subjects, such as mathematics.
According to Xing Heping (2008, 370) The Phnom Penh Evening News, launched in 2010 with a target market of businesses and migrants from China, is the youngest of the four papers. A journalist from a government paper in Liuzhou, the city in Guangxi where the machinery manufacturer is based, was invited to be editor in chief, but he returned to China after less than a year. He was followed by his former deputy, who, in addition to a third young journalist, had also arrived from
Guangxi. The rest of the staff are locally recruited Sino-Khmers, whom the paper sometimes sends to China for trainings. In addition, journalists from China sometimes come for shortterm stays. Next to stories about Chinese investments and aid projects and local stories written by the staff, the paper carries news and entertainment items picked up from mainland
Chinese news agencies and Internet portals such as Xinhuanet, people.com.cn, and
Sina.com.cn. In 2011, the paper ran a series about the history of the Chinese Communist Party, no doubt timed for its ninetieth anniversary celebrations. While such a profile-a high share of content from the Chinese Internet, reluctance to go beyond topics and opinions accepted by mainland China's censors, and reliance on migrant entrepreneurs for advertising revenue-is typical for media run by new Chinese migrants anywhere (see Nyíri 2007, 124-127; Nyíri 2010, 56-58 ), Cambodia's two "local" Chinese newspapers are also becoming increasingly similar. This is due to a growing number of mainland Chinese journalists and editors, trainings in China offered to local journalists, and a rising share of content from mainland Chinese sources that are accelerating a shift away from a distinctive local Chinese usage toward that of the People's Republic. In 2000, the older of the two local papers, Commercial News, hired a migrant from China as its editor in chief. "Severe shortage of human resources" locally is the reason his Cambodian-Chinese deputy gives for this decision. Yet in fact, this editor, Liu, is not a professional newspaperman; although he published a novel in his youth, he first came to Cambodia in 1998 to import clothing. His appointment seems to be driven by a general preference for individuals with tertiary education from China to locals, who generally have only secondary education, for jobs that require cultural skills, creativity, or technical competence. These individuals are also seen as representing an "authentic" Chinese culture with which locally born Chinese are increasingly out of touch and need to be reacquainted.
Liu acknowledges that the media coverage of China has changed the way second-and third-generation Chinese Cambodians see the country: "If we didn't present it in this [positive] way, they might never go back [to China], they might think it is still a poor place." As much as half of the paper is devoted to coverage of China, with news items taken exclusively from Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, whose political vocabulary would have been unfamiliar to a Cambodian readership a few years earlier. In addition, some articles are clearly contributed by writers trained in the mainland. For example, a long feature from an October 2007 issue that Liu gave me in manuscript, which praised the Chinese engineers and workers who were constructing Highway 7 from Kratie to the Lao border, was written as if for readers in China rather than Cambodia, stating, for example, that "Cambodia lies in the tropics." Three or four years ago, the paper switched to simplified characters, partly to cater to an increasing share of recent migrants, partly for the students who learn simplified characters at school, and partly because the typesetting system they use is from mainland China.
The other "local" Chinese newspaper, the ACC's Jian Hua Daily, also has recent migrants from China on its staff. One of them, a junior editor, came to Cambodia right after graduating from university because he was unable to find a job in China and had an aunt living in Phnom Penh. As the official newspaper of an organization that is in some ways part of the Cambodian party-state, Jian Hua sees its editorial policy as the following: to "strengthen positive propaganda, dampen the effect of negative news" and "regard questions that are sensitive or whose nature has not yet been determined (wei dingxing de )… follow the Royal Government's position and attitude … correctly guide discourse … play the role of a bridge in foreign trade" (Jian Hua Daily 2006, 234) . At the same time, the young mainland Chinese editor told me that the paper would not publish any material that was "against China's interests," and that regular dinners with officials from the Chinese embassy provided informal guidance on what these interests were to aid in covering particular news stories.
The view that new migrants should, because of their assumed patriotism toward China and their familiarity with China's contemporary realities, be instruments of such "resinicization" has been held by the Qiaoban for some time, and, in a 1996 policy document, it called on "strengthening guidance" for publishers of Chinese newspapers overseas (Nyíri 2010, 56) . At least in Cambodia, ethnic Chinese appear to have naturalized the view that recruits from China, as both more professional and more authentic, are better able to lead interests of major sponsors and of the Cambodian party-state itself. More significant is the trend that local options of articulating a Chinese identity-focused on dialect-group identities, ties to ancestral homelands, and worship of particular gods-are once again, as in the early twentieth century (Skinner 1957; Wang Gunwu 1981) , increasingly marginalized or pushed back into the private sphere in favor of a standard way of public speaking and feeling that is imported from China. And even the cults of gods may be "retransnationalized" in ways that create direct links to religious centers in China instead of the old ones to the ancestral homeland. One of Oknha Keth's current projects is fundraising, among Chinese worldwide, for a Guanyin temple in Jiangsu Province, which houses a relic of the bodhisattva Guanyin.
Toward New Ways of Being Chinese in Cambodia
The political economy of Sino-Cambodian relations in the past decade and a half has set in motion flows of capital, information, and people that caused a shift in the public framing and, at least to some extent, the private meaning of being Chinese in Cambodia.
Closely related to the way that the Cambodian government and official media are embracing The pressures of a standardized framework of Chinese ethnicity, of reethnicization and retransnationalization, do not extend evenly. Those whose aspirations for a better life benefit from Chineseness as a resource will be subjected to it more strongly than others. As buoyed by an opening to international business but fraught with political suspicion and strictly regulated, is sparse. In Thailand, where hybrid forms of Chinese identity have been as prevalent as in Cambodia but where the state has been less interested in policing ethnic boundaries, the politics of Chinese ethnicity have recently been more entangled with the domestic struggle between "red shirts" and "orange shirts" than with relations to China. In other words, the complex and diverse picture that Chinese ethnicity presents in Southeast Asia is unlikely to disappear. The combination of Cambodia's poverty, its authoritarian politics and clientelist economy, its political closeness to China, and the decimation of its traditional Chinese community institutions may be uniquely favorable to "retransnationalization." Overall, however, the increased prestige of Chinese ethnicity across the region, noted already in 1997 by Szanton Blanc and linked both to the rise of "pop culture China" in the media (Chua 2001) and to the growing clout of the Chinese state, comes with Today's PRC is, of course, not the first Chinese state that wishes to bring ethnic Chinese overseas under the symbolic umbrella of a deterritorialized and racialized Chinese nation. The late Qing's and the Chinese Republic's successful efforts at such "sojourn work" (Vasantkumar 2012) , also focused on schools and newspapers, have been well documented (Wang Gunwu 1981; Duara 1997; Karl 2002) . Their latest round goes back to the early 1990s, when the government of the PRC upgraded the Chinese overseas from friendly sources of investment-as it saw them in the 1980s-to a resource for cultural legitimation within a discourse of state nationalism (see Barabantseva 2011) . What the latest mutations in the politics of Chineseness in today's Cambodia attest to, however, is the centrality of economic incentives and the mediatized "soft power" of a popularized Chinese culture, along with the relative marginality of state policies, in effecting such a transformation. If the first "transnationalization" of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia was the result of an "influx of nationalist activists and ideology" (Duara 1997, 42) , arising from the ferment of a decaying empire, then their current retransnationalization is primarily the work of investors, managers, and professionals who have unselfsconsciously internalized the late socialist discourse of the Chinese nation.
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